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The 1990 Supreme Court term, as usual, produced several cases
that had an impact on the employment relationship. Some cases were
of great importance. The Court, for example, approved the first ever
significant use of administrative rule-making power by the National
Labor Relations Board. It again considered the extent to which unions
can charge non-members for services rendered; and, in a landmark
case, it struck down an employer's discriminatory policy aimed at pro-
tecting fetuses from work-place hazards. These and other important
employment law cases from the last term are reviewed below.1
II. 1990-91 SUPREME COURT EMPLOYMENT LAW DECISIONS
A. National Labor Relations Act and Duty of Fair Representation
Cases
1. Litton Financial Printing Division v. NLRB
Labor law produces few neutrals. The nature of the business is
that most labor professionals line up according to the side they are on,
or at least the side they are paid to be on. Because of the partisan
nature of the business, most advocates will view Litton Financial Print-
ing Division v. NLRB2 according to its effect on their' representational
interests. Labor law not only produces few neutrals, it also produces
little certainty. Previous Supreme Court decisions provide what cer-
tainty does exist. Although the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or Board)3 may fluctuate with the political winds of the ad-
ministration, the Court usually abides by its prior opinions. The
Court's response in Litton, however, demonstrates that even this is not
always true.
Professor, Indiana University School of Law - Bloomington; J.D., Ohio State University
School of Law, 1971.
I. This article is not an exhaustive summary of cases that affected the employment relation-
ship. Some cases were omitted either because of their limited importance or because they are not
of significant general interest. See, e.g, Martin v. Occupational and Health Review Comm., 111 S.
Ct. 1171 (interim ed. 1991); Norfolk & Western R.R. v. American Train Dispatchers Assoc., I l'l
S. Ct. 1156 (interim ed. 1991); Air Courier Conf. of Am. v. American Postal Workers, AFL-CIO,
Ill S. Ct. 913 (interim ed. 1991).
2. 111 S. Ct. 2215 (interim ed. 1991).
3. The NLRB is the administrative agency charged with enforcement of the National Labor
Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 154-55 (1988).
34 UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW
There were two principal issues in the case, one of which should
have been non-controversial. The case arose following expiration of a
collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the Printing
Specialties and Paper Products Union in 1979. In August of that year
the union barely survived a decertification election. The Board finally
certified the results of the election the following July and the employer
decided to test that decision by refusing to bargain. This was the only
way to obtain judicial review of the NLRB's action.4 During the pen-
dency of the proceedings, the employer eliminated part of its operation
and, accordingly, laid off 10 employees, including 6 of the most senior
workers in the plant.5
Although both the Supreme Court and the NLRB found special
significance in the terms of the layoff clause in the expired contract, in
fact there was nothing very special about it. As is fairly common, the
clause said that seniority would "be the determining factor if other
things such as aptitude and ability are equal."' The union filed a griev-
ance protesting the employer's action but, the contract having expired,
the employer refused to process the grievance or arbitrate the dispute.
The union filed unfair labor practice charges with the Board, alleging
that the employer's refusal to process the grievances to arbitration vio-
lated section 8(a)(5).7
The General Counsel8 issued a complaint in November 1980, but
it was more than six years later before the Board issued its opinion.
The Board said the employer had a duty to bargain about the layoffs
and, of more importance to the issue before the Court, held that unilat-
eral abandonment of the grievance procedure violated section 8(a)(5).
In addition, the Board said a wholesale repudiation of the arbitration
process violated section 8(a)(5).9 The Board relied on the Supreme
Court's opinion in Nolde Brothers, Inc. v. Local 358, Bakery and Con-
fectionery Workers Union"0 where, in a different context, the Court
said that arbitration could survive contract expiration." Although
4. Employers cannot obtain direct review of NLRB orders in representational cases since
they are not "'final orders." See ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION
AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 59-61 (1976).
5. Litton, III S. Ct. at 2219.
6. Id.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988).
8. The general counsel is not the attorney for the NLRB. The statutory responsibilities are
set out in 29 U.S.C. section 153(d). The general counsel acts as prosecutor in unfair labor practice
cases. Id. § 153(d).
9. Litton, Il1 S. Ct. at 2221-22.
10. 430 U.S. 243 (1977).
11. Id. at 252-53.
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Nolde Brothers did not involve interpretation of section 8(a)(5), in sub-
sequent cases the NLRB had extended the Court's rationale to aspects
of its section 8(a)(5) analysis. 2
Despite its finding that the employer had violated the Act by its
abrogation of the contractual grievance-arbitration procedure, the
Board refused to order the employer to arbitrate the layoff grievances
as part of its remedial order. The Board reasoned that the grievances
had not arisen under the contract, as the Court had defined the test in
Nolde and as the Board had adopted it in Indiana and Michigan Elec-
tric Company." The court of appeals rejected the Board's conclusion
that the grievances were not arbitrable. 4 The Supreme Court agreed to
review the decision.
The Court began its review by discussing NLRB v. Katz,"5 and
interpreted the .case to mean that an employer cannot act unilaterally
with respect to matters covered by the contract even following contract
expiration, absent impasse. Although this interpretation does not ex-
actly comport with the language of the Katz opinion,"6 the Board has
consistently interpreted it in this fashion and the Court has deferred to
the Board's prior interpretations. Nevertheless, even though unilateral
change can violate section 8(a)(5), the Court said that some contract
provisions fall outside the doctrine, including arbitration clauses. The
Board has adhered to this view since 1970.1" The union attacked the
rule in Litton but the Court deferred to the Board's judgment, finding
it rational and consistent with the Act. 18 Thus, the Court resolved the
dispute using the analysis it ordinarily applies to the Board's statutory
12. See, e.g., Indiana and Michigan Elec. Co., 284 N.L.R.B. 53 (1987). Typically, the
NLRB has no role to play in determining the arbitrability of grievances. Whether a party has
agreed to arbitrate is a matter of contract interpretation. These substantive arbitrability determi-
nations are reserved for the courts, although they, too, play only limited roles. See, e.g., United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
13. 284 N.L.R.B. 53 (1987). In Indiana and Michigan Electric, the Board declared that it
would order arbitration as a remedy for an employer's 8(a)(5) violation "only when the grievances
at issue arise under the expired contract." Indiana and Michigan Elec., 286 N.L.R.B. at 821. In
Litton, however, the Board determined that the grievances did not arise under the contract be-
cause the layoffs occurred after expiration of the agreement and because layoff by seniority was a
right to be found only in the contract. Id.
14. 893 F.2d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 1990). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals declared that
the right to be laid off in the order of senioiity did arise under the contract. Id. at 1139.
15. 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
16. The Court did say "an employer's unilateral change in conditions of employment under
negotiation is . . .. a violation of 8(a)(5), for it is a circumvention of the duty to negotiate which
frustrates the objectives of 8(a)(5) much as does a flat refusal." Id. at 743. But the Court did not
necessarily hold that it was necessary to reach impasse before an employer could act unilaterally.
Thus, in a significant footnote, the Court implied that it might be sufficient for an employer to act
"after notice and consultation." Id. at 745 n.12.
17. See Hilton-Davis Chem. Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 241 (1970).
18. Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, Ill S. Ct. 2215, 2222 (interim ed. 1991).
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interpretations. The result is that arbitration agreements survive expi-
ration under the Katz rationale only if the parties expressly agree that
they survive, an eventuality that seems unlikely.
The Court then turned to the more controversial part of the opin-
ion which involved the union's contention that, having found an unfair
labor practice, the Board should have ordered the employer to arbitrate
the grievances as a remedy. In Litton, the union had not sought a court
order to arbitrate under section 301 of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act.19 Nevertheless, in resolving the remedy issue, both the Board
and the Court premised much of their discussion on Nolde Brothers,
which was a section 301 case.
The Court has held that the NLRB has both the right and the'
obligation to structure remedies. Moreover, the Court has often ob-
served that courts owe considerable deference to the remedies fashioned
by the Board.20 Even so, the Court said it owed no such obligation in
this case. The Board's remedy, the Court said, was not based on the,
policy of the Act but rather was influenced by the Board's interpreta-
tion of the contract. But, the Court recognized that the Board is not an
expert in the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements; rather,
interpretation of these agreements is the province shared by courts and
arbitrators. 1
The Court noted that section 8(a)(5) was not the only source of
power to order reluctant employers into arbitration. In addition, federal
as well as state courts have the power to make substantive arbitrability
determinations under their section 301 jurisdiction.22 Typically, such
determinations have little to do with the court's view about the sub-
stance of the claim. Rather, the court's function, according to the
Steelworkers' Trilogy,23 is to see whether the arbitration clause is sus-
ceptible to an interpretation that would include the union's grievance.
If so, the court orders the employer to arbitrate and the arbitrator de-
cides the merits of the contractual claim.24
Orders to arbitrate under section 301 are not necessarily precluded
simply because the contract- that contains the arbitration agreement
19. 29 U.S.C. section 185 authorizes suits by and against unions for violation of labor con-
tracts. The basics of so-called 301 actions are reviewed in GORMAN, supra note 4, at 543-51.
20. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
21. Litton, 111 S. Ct. at 2223.
22. Id.
23. What is popularly known as the Steelworker's Trilogy is a group of cases about labor
arbitration decided on the same day in 1960. United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co.;
363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960).
24. For a review of the Steelworkers' Trilogy, see GORMAN, supra note 4, at 551-61.
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has expired. The Court recognized as much when it decided Nolde in
1977.25 There, the union sought arbitration of its claim that contractual
severance benefits survived expiration of the contract."' The Court said
that the union's claim required interpretation of-the severance pay arti-
cle of the contract, given the union's assertion that severance payments
were vested benefits that survived expiration. 7
In order to decide Litton as the Court did, Justice Kennedy, writ-
ing for the five justice majority, had to do two things; first, he had to
distort what the Court had said in Nolde and second, he had to ignore
much of what the Court said about arbitrability determinations in the
Steelworkers Trilogy. Justice Kennedy read Nolde quite narrowly. He
said it justified a post contract order to arbitrate in only three in-
stances: (1) where the case actually arose before expiration, a matter
that has never really been in controversy; (2) where something the em-
ployer does after expiration infringes on accrued or vested rights, which
is how Justice Kennedy viewed the situation in Nolde; and (3) where
the clause survives under normal principles of contract interpretation,
which was not at issue in Litton or Nolde 8
Justice Kennedy said the question was whether the layoff clause at
issue - or more aptly, the seniority provisions of it - amounted to the
kinds of vested rights which could be assumed to survive contract expi-
ration. Justice Kennedy said they could not. He surmised that a clause
based solely on seniority might survive, but that the clause in Litton
was not of that type. As evidence, he pointed to language accepted by
labor practitioners as boiler plate language referring to seniority as de-
terminative when ability and aptitude are equal.2 9
Such provisions are commonplace in collective bargaining agree-
ments. Although Justice Kennedy's opinion made much of the refer-
ence to ability and aptitude, labor arbitrators have typically not re-
quired a union to show equality of skill among employees in order to
invoke the seniority provisions of the such clauses. In the ordinary case,
a union need show nothing more than that employees are qualified to
perform the work. Seniority is usually the determining factor.
Justice Kennedy's focus on the wording of the layoff clause was
prompted by his reading of Nolde, an opinion which he said was nar-
rowly crafted so as to apply only to vested rights.30 This narrow focus is
25. Nolde Bros. Inc. v. Local 358, 430 U.S. 243 (1977).
26. Id. at 247. The employer had announced its decision to close following expiration of the
contract and the parties' inability to reach a new agreement. Id.
27. Id. at 249.
28. Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 111 S. Ct. 2215, 2225 (interim ed. 1991).
29. Id. at 2227.
30. Id. at 2225.
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simply not justified by any fair reading of Nolde. It is true that Nolde
involved severance pay rights which the union claimed were vested, but
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion was quite broad. He said the
severance'pay claim clearly would have been arbitrable had it arisen
under the contract and there was nothing in the arbitration clause
which indicated that similar occurrences after expiration were to be
excluded.31 This omission was important, the Court said, because "the
parties must be deemed to have been conscious" of the Court's strong
preference for arbitration of disputes over collective bargaining agree-
ments.32 Their failure to exclude such disputes from the arbitration
process, then, was significant. "In short, where the dispute is over a
provision of the expired agreement, the presumptions favoring arbi-
trability must be negated expressly or by clear implication. 3
Whatever one may think of this reasoning, it is at least clear that
it was not merely the nature of the claim that made the Nolde dispute
arbitrable. The Nolde opinion said clearly that, the union having raised
a claim to contract rights, the interpretation of the contract was up to
the arbitrator.3 4 It was the breadth of the arbitration clause that made
the difference, not the union's assertion that the employees' rights were
vested.
In Litton, however, Justice Kennedy did exactly what the Court.
had instructed lower courts not to do for more than a quarter of a
century. Rather than look to see whether the arbitration clause was
susceptible to an interpretation that made the claim arbitrable - in-
deed, he barely looked at the clause - Justice Kennedy simply decided
the merits of the dispute. The union essentially claimed that certain
seniority rights were intended by the parties to survive expiration, a
grievance that it said was arbitrable under Nolde since the clause did
not exclude post termination arbitrations.3 5
Having advanced a plausible, although debatably correct, interpre-
tation of the contract and having shown that the claim on its face was
arbitrable, the Court should simply have ordered the case into arbitra-
tion and let an arbitrator decide it. Arbitrators may well have agreed
with Justice Kennedy's conclusion that the contract furnished no relief.
The point, however, is that such a decision should have been made in
the proper forum and previous Supreme Court decisions had made it
clear that the forum was arbitration. As the Supreme Court has said,
31. Nolde, 430 U.S. at 252.
32. Id. at 255.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, III S. Ct. 2215, 2223 (interim ed. 1991).
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the courts are not to review the merits of a controversy in making arbi-
trability decisions, but there is no other way to describe what Kennedy
did.
Whether this approach will have any effect outside post expiration
claims is the real question raised by Litton. Although the Court did not
admit it, the analysis used here was not only different from that applied
in previous cases, but it was what the Court consistently had instructed
courts not to do.
2. American Hospital Association v. NLRB
Like moft administrative agencies, the NLRB has the full range of
administrative rule-making power.3 6 Unlike most administrative agen-
cies, however, the Board has seldom employed its rule-making author-
ity, at least for issues other than procedural issues. Rather, the NLRB
has acted principally through its adjudicative power, preferring to de-
fine general principles through litigation. It has thereby fashioned what
amounts to a common law system operating under the general frame-
work of the National Labor Relations Act.
Students of the Board's work have come to accept this system as
the norm; and, practitioners have learned to live with - indeed, even
to profit from - the Board's periodic and fairly frequent shifts in posi-
tion.3" The Board has never fully explained its preference for litigation
over the legislative rule-making process used by most other agencies.
But there is no doubt that the power such course of action affords indi-
vidual Board members to influence and change legal rules in relatively.
rapid fashion is, among the considerations.
Despite this history, the Board departed from its usual practice in
1990 when it adopted 29 CFR section 103.30, a substantive rule defin-
ing appropriate bargaining units in the health care industry. This was
an issue previously settled exclusively in adjudication in every industry,
including health care.3 8 The Board had tried the adjudicative process in
health care as well, but, after a decade and a half of haggling with
federal courts of appeals, who typically defer to Board unit determina-
tions in other industries, the Board opted for rule-making.39
36. 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1988).
37. For a review of how NLRB doctrine can change rapidly (often after a change in the
administration), see Terry A. Bethel, Recent Decisions of the NLRB - The Reagan Influence, 60
IND. L.J. 227 (1985).
38. Section 9(b) of the National Labor Relations Act empowers the Board to decide "in
each case whether . . . the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the
employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof .... .. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1988).
Courts of appeals typically defer to the Board's unit determinations. See GORMAN supra note 4, at
67.
39. For a review of the Board's early experience in health care unit determinations, and the
reactions of the courts of appeals, see T. Merritt Bumpass, Jr., Appropriate Bargaining Units in
1991]
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The particular terms of the rule were not really at issue in Ameri-
can Hospital Association v. NLRB." In brief, the Board's new rule
sets a limit of eight appropriate bargaining units in acute care hospi-
tals, subject to three exceptions." The exceptions are cases that present
extraordinary circumstances, cases in which nonconforming units al-
ready exist, and cases in which labor organizations seek to combine
units, which obviously would lead to fewer than eight.'
The American Hospital Association (AHA) along with hospital la-
bor counsel, which had used this issue to delay and frustrate collective
bargaining ever since the 1974 Health Care Amendments' 3 became ef-
fective, attacked the Board's new rule on three grounds. First, the peti-
tioners claimed that rule-making itself was inappropriate because the
express terms of section 9(b) require unit determinations "in each
case," which the petitioners essentially read to mean "on a case by case
basis." A unanimous Supreme Court rejected that challenge."
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, observed that initiative
for selection of the bargaining unit comes from the employees or, more
accurately, from the union. The union petitions the Board for an elec-
tion forthe unit it desires.' 5 Thereafter, employers can resist by claim-
ing that the unit described in the petition is inappropriate. The matter
then falls to the Board which is obligated to decide if the unit re-
quested is appropriate. Accepting several decades of Board decisions,
the Supreme Court said that the Board need not determine the most
appropriate unit; rather, the question is if the union has petitioned for
an appropriate unit.'
Historically, these distinctions have been made following adjudica-
tive hearings in so-called R cases, conducted before hearing officers
from the Board's regional offices. The Court said, however, that the
Act does not require that procedure, and the words "in each case" can-
not be read to prevent the implementation of industry wide bargaining
unit rules.' Rather, the words mean the Board will settle disputes
Health Care Institutions: An Analysis of Congressional Intent and its Implementation by the
National Labor Relations Board, 20 B.C.L. REV. 820 (1979).
40. 111 S. Ct. 1539 (interim ed. 1991).
41. Id. at 1541.
42. Id.
43. The NLRA excluded non profit hospitals from coverage until 1974 by expressly exclud-
ing them from the Act's definition of "employer." 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1988). The exemption was
removed in 1974 simply by deleting from the definition the language concerning non-profit
hospitals.
44. American Hosp., Ill S. Ct. at 1547.





"whenever necessary" or "in any case in which there is a dispute," us-
ing for guidance not only the policies of the statute but also rules devel-
oped in adjudication and rule-making.4 8
In addition, the Court said, nothing in the statute prohibits de-
lineating rules for specific industries.4 9 In that regard, the Court noted
that the Board had not, contrary to the employef's contention, devel-
oped an irrebuttable presumption.5 0 Rather, the rule contained an ex-
ception for "extraordinary circumstances" and the Board still had to
apply its rules "in each case."''5
The AHA's second attack was more familiar and had enjoyed par-
ticular success in the courts of appeals, 52 whose opinions the Supreme
Court completely ignored. Nonprofit hospitals had been expressly ex-
empted from NLRB jurisdiction as part of the Taft Hartley Amend-
ments of 1947, a situation that prevailed until the 1974 Health Care
Amendments. In form, those amendments did little more than remove
the exemption from the Act's definition of employer. In particular,
Congress did not change the provisions of Section 9 that deal with ap-
propriate unit determinations.
That does not mean, however, that Congress had no concern about
unit determination issues in the health care industry. Indeed, hospital
lobbyists, pointing to the multitude of crafts and professions in every
hospital, cautioned that a multiplicity of units increased the risk of
strife which, in turn, might affect patient care. An attempt in 1973 to
remove the nonprofit hospital exemption would have limited hospital
bargaining units to no more than five. 53 The bill that passed the follow-
ing year had no such provision but it was accompanied by a very im-
portant sentence of legislative history: "Due consideration should be
given by the Board to preventing proliferation of bargaining units in
the health care industry. ' 54 The same history noted committee ap-
proval of three NLRB decisions concerning unit determinations in for-
profit hospitals. 55
It is fair to make two observations about what came to be known
as the congressional admonition. First, in its early health care deci-
sions, the Board paid no attention to it, other than to claim that it had
48. Id. at 1542-43.
49. Id. at 1543.
50. Id.
51. id.
52. See, e.g., Bumpass, supra note 39, at 898-900.
53. American Hosp., 111 S. Ct. at 1544.
54. Id. at 1545 (quoting S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974); H.R. REP. No.
1051, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3946, 3950).
55. Id.
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duly considered the matter. Second, the courts of appeals treated this
legislative history as though it were part of the statute."6
Neither of these reactions, perhaps, was justified, but the Board at
least had the wording of the statute on its side. By the time the Health
Care Amendments were passed, the Board had been making unit deter-
minations for 39 years and its views on the matter, though perhaps no
more consistent than the Board's views on anything else, were at least
not a secret. With this as background, Congress knew how to limit the
Board's discretion if it had wanted to do so. In fact, the bill introduced
the previous year limited the Board's discretion, but, the limitations did
not appear in the version that became the Health Care Amendments.
The Board could argue with some force, then, that while it was sup-
posed to give "consideration" to the number of health care bargaining
units, it was not disabled from applying to hospitals the same criteria it
applied to other industries.
The federal appellate courts, however, did not subscribe to this
view. They frequently pointed to the congressional admonition and
scolded the Board for failing to heed it. None of this was lost on hospi-
tal labor counsel. Because Board unit determinations can only be re-
viewed following unfair labor practice proceedings, 57 hospitals that re-
sisted NLRB unit determination could often delay bargaining
indefinitely.
Somewhat surprisingly, the Supreme Court spent little time detail-
ing the battleground over the congressional admonition. No doubt be-
cause the American Hospital Association used the legislative history
primarily to bolster its argument that section 9(b) required a case by
case analysis, an approach which the Court rejected. The Court merely
said that the petitioners did not "and obviously could not contend that
this statement in the Committee reports has the force of law."58 The
Court's declaration effectively razed the actions of several courts of ap-
peals. The Court viewed the admonition, not as a statute, but rather, as
a warning from Congress that Board intransigence might result in fur-
ther congressional action.59 The AHA did "suggest" that the admoni-
tion was an "authoritative statement of what Congress intended."' 0
The Court, however, said that the extensive rule-making proceedings
were themselves the "due consideration" desired by Congress.6"
56. See, e.g., St. Vincent's Hosp. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977). "The legislative
history of the health care amendments . . . makes it quite clear that Congress has directed the
-Board to apply a standard in this field that was not traditional." Id. at 592.
57. For an explanation of the circuitous route a party must travel to obtain review of an
NLRB representation decision, see GORMAN, supra note 4, at 59-61.
58. American Hosp., I ll S. Ct. at 1545.
59. Id. at. 1545-46.




The third line of attack was the AHA's claim that the rule was
arbitrary because it applied alike to all acute care hospitals and ignored
"critical differences." 62 To support its concern, the AHA pointed to a
previous Board opinion that said the hospital industry was too diverse
to warrant generalizations about unit determination. The Court man-
aged to say that this case was not necessarily inconsistent with the new
rules, but said it would .not be troubled even if it were. Rather, it
pointed to the rule-making procedures and to the Board's well reasonedjustification for its action. It also observed, as it had in cases reviewing
NLRB adjudicative action, that as an agency's expertise evolves, which
for the Board usually means when its politics change, the agency is free
to change its rules as long as its action is based on substantial evidence
and a reasoned analysis. Those criteria were satisfied in this case. 63
3. Groves v. Ring Screw Works
The conventional wisdom, supported by ample Supreme Court pre-
cedent, is that labor arbitration is a substitute for industrial strife.6
Even casual observers of labor relations recognize the favored treat-
ment the Court has shown to arbitration. One principal manifestation
of the Court's preference for arbitration is its policy with respect to
litigation brought by individual employees under collective bargaining
agreements. Despite the language of section 301, employees typically
cannot sue their employers for breach of contract unless they can show
exhaustion of, or at least an attempt to exhaust, their contractual reme-
dies and a breach of the duty of fair representation by the union.65
Typically, employees cannot sue their employers if they have previously
arbitrated the case or if the union in good faith decided not to arbi-
trate, even though the contract contained such a procedure.
An issue that has arisen on occasion is whether section 301 litiga-
tion is precluded if the collective bargaining agreement contains no ar-
bitration clause. That was the situation in Groves v. Ring Screw
Works, Ferndale Fastener Division,66 decided by the Court on Decem-
ber 10, 1990. The contracts at issue contained a four-step grievance
procedure which, in discharge cases, could culminate in arbitration
only by mutual agreement.67 Both agreements prohibited strikes or
lockouts while grievances were processed, but did not ban them after
"negotiations have failed through the grievance procedure .
62. Id. at 1546.
63. Id. at 1546-47.
64. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
65. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
66. 111 S. Ct. 498 (interim ed. 1990).
67. Id. at 500-01.
68. Id. at 501.
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The litigation arose following the discharge of two employees
whose cases were not settled in the grievance procedure. Nor did the
parties agree to arbitration. Clearly, under the contract, the union
could have gone on strike. Instead, both employees sued for breach of
contract under section 301. The district court granted summary judg-
ment, relying on a Sixth Circuit opinion that the existence of griev-
ance-arbitration machinery precludes judicial action, even if the dis-
pute machinery, by contract, is not final and binding.6 9 The Sixth
Circuit affirmed, holding that the collective bargaining agreement
made a strike the exclusive remedy for the alleged breach of contract,
thus precluding other forms of dispute settlement.
70
The district court decision was fairly typical of a result arrived at
when the contracts involved contain arbitration clauses. The difficulty
in Groves was that the parties had not agreed to resolve their disputes
through arbitration. The issue was actually two-fold: first, whether the
parties had established the strike as an exclusive remedy; and second,
given the national labor policy favoring peaceful resolution of labor dis-
putes, whether the parties could establish a strike as an exclusive rem-
edy. The Court's short opinion does not clearly answer the second
question.
The Court noted a strong presumption favoring access to a neutral
forum - a court - for peaceful resolution of disputes. But, it said that
the presumption could be overcome when the parties have agreed on a
different method of adjustment, like binding arbitration. 71 That ar-
rangement is consistent with section 203(d) of the Taft Hartley Act
which provides that "final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the
parties is the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes
arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective
bargaining agreement. 72
The Court said that the "desirable method" envisioned by section
203(d) was not merely an agreement to resolve disputes. Rather, the
statute contemplated the "peaceful resolution of disputes. '73 The par-
ties could agree to resolve differences through economic warfare, but
the Court said "the statute surely does not favor such an agreement ' 74
which is not really a way of resolving the merits of-a controversy.
69. Id. (relying on Fortune v. National Twist Drill & Tool Div., Lear Siegler, Inc., 684
F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1982)).
70. Groves v. Ring Screw Works, 882 F.2d 1081 (6th Cir. 1989), rev'd, III S. Ct. 498
(Interim ed. 1990).
71. Groves, III S. Ct. at 502.
72. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1988).
73. Groves, 11l S. Ct. at 502.
74. id. at 503.
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The Court then quoted at length from a Seventh Circuit opinion 75
in which, like this case, the union had a right to strike over grievances.
That fact by itself, the Seventh Circuit had said, did not establish that
the parties had adopted a strike as "an exclusive or even desirable
method for settling deadlocked grievances."" The contract permitted
strikes but did not compel them as a way of settling grievances. Thus,
the Seventh Circuit concluded that "an agreement to forbid any judi-
cial participation . . . would have to be written more clearly . ... ,77
The Supreme Court said the same reasoning applied in Groves.
The inference, then, is that parties could provide economic action
as the exclusive means of settling disputes over the meaning of collec-
tive bargaining agreements. This seems true regardless of the Court's
observation that such an agreement is not within the spirit of section
203(d). Any such agreement, however, has to be clear and unambigu-
ous. It is not sufficient merely to reserve the right to strike, which is
what the parties had done in Groves, even when the contract contains
no arbitration clause. In Groves, the parties had not agreed to eco-
nomic warfare as the exclusive remedy and the employees could file
suit under section 301.
4. Airline Pilots v. O'Neill
Airline Pilots v. O'Neil7' involved a subject the Court had not
often considered, the scope of the duty of fair representation in the
context of the union's obligation to negotiate labor contracts on behalf
of the employees it represents. Today, most discussion of the duty of
fair representation (DFR) proceeds from Vaca v. Sipes," an important
case decided by the Court in 1967.
In language that has become quite familiar, the Court defined a
union's duty by saying that a breach consisted of an action that was
"arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." 81 Vaca, like most DFR
cases considered by the Court, involved a claim by an individual em-
ployee who was dissatisfied with the way the union had handled his
grievance. In fact, in Vaca, the union, without breaching the duty of
fair representation, refused to arbitrate the case.
75. Associated Gen. Contractors of Illinois v. Illinois Conference of Teamsters, 486 F.2d
972 (7th Cir. 1973).
76. Id. at 976.
77. Id.
78. Groves, 111 S. Ct. at 503.
79. 111 S. Ct. 1127 (interim ed. 1991).
80. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
81. Id. at 190.
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In another famous case predating Vaca, the Court considered the
union's duty in collective bargaining and, in Ford Motor Company v.
Huffman,81 the Court's opinion contained language which has been
quoted often. It said the union must be allowed "a wide range of rea-
sonableness .. . in serving the unit it represents, subject always to
complete good faith and honesty of purpose."83
Language from both Vaca and Huffman was implicated in the
Court's decision in O'Neill. The case grew out of the airline pilots asso-
ciation strike against Continental Airlines in 1983. The strike was a
reaction to the airline's chapter 11 reorganization petition and its repu-
diation of its collective bargaining agreement with the union. When the
strike began, the bargaining unit included about 2,000 pilots and all
but about 200 supported the strike. Over time, some 400 employees
crossed the picket line, and when added to 1000 new hires, joined a
total pilot force of about 1600 employees. The strike was "acrimoni-
ous" and included a purported withdrawal of recognition by Continen-
tal and a lawsuit by the union.84
In September of 1989, Continental announced its posting of a
"supplementary base vacancy bid 1985-5," which the Court referred to
as the 85-5 bid.85 Historically, pilots bid system-wide and vacant posi-
tions were assigned by seniority. The 85-5 bid was unusually large, cov-
ering more than 400 vacancies for captain and first officer positions
alone. The union was concerned that the bid might effectively freeze
out striking pilots, so it authorized them to submit bids. Ultimately,
Continental expressed concern about the sincerity of these bids and an-
nounced that all of the 85-5 bids would go to working pilots.8 6
This action prompted the union to negotiate an end to the strike.
The parties came up with three options for striking pilots: first, those
who settled all claims with the airline could participate in the bid; sec-
ond, pilots could elect severance pay under a formula that resulted in
average pay-outs of about $47,000 to the 366 pilots who participated;
and third, pilots who refused to settle claims could return to work only
after those pilots who did settle. 7
The problem was that the company had not allotted all of the jobs
according to seniority, as it had traditionally done. Striking pilots who
took the first option received some jobs that had already been allocated
to working pilots, but the company used a formula which allotted all of
82. 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
83. Id. at 338.
84. Airline Pilots v. O'Neill, 111 S. Ct. 1127, 1130 (interim ed. 1991).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1130-31.
87. Id. at 1131.
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the first 100 jobs to working (non-striking) pilots, the next 72 jobs to
returning pilots, and the remaining jobs to each group on a one-to-one
basis. Thus, the strikers fared worse than if they had chosen jobs
strictly on the basis of seniority. 88
Apparently, it was this realization that prompted a group of for-
mer strikers to file suit against the union claiming breach of the duty of
fair representation on several grounds, including arbitrary treatment.
The district court granted summary judgment for the union, although
it characterized the settlement achieved by the union as "atrocious in
retrospect.' 8 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. The
appellate court applied an arbitrariness standard to the union's action
and concluded that a jury could find its actions to be arbitrary because
the settlement seemingly left the striking pilots worse off than capitula-
tion by the union would have. This conclusion depended on an assump-
tion that Continental would have filled all vacancies solely on the basis
of seniority had the union merely surrendered. The court of appeals
also said there was a material issue of fact about whether favored
treatment of working pilots constituted discrimination against
strikers. 90
The union's position in the Supreme Court is not the sort it raises
during organizational campaigns. Relying principally on NLRB v. In-
surance Agents' International Union9 and on a line of cases-stressing
the need to disassociate the government from the substance of collec-
tive bargaining, the union argued that the duty of fair representation
did not obligate it to provide adequate representation. 2 The Court,
however, likened the union's duty to that of a fiduciary, and said there
was a "critical difference" between government scrutiny of collective
bargaining to determine fairness and adequacy of representation, and
government action that seeks to impose contract terms.93
The Court also rejected the.union's contention that the wide range
of reasonableness admonition in Ford Motor Company v. Huffman 4
exempted the union from review of its collective bargaining perform-
ance. In fact, some courts of appeals distinguished between the duty
owed in collective bargaining and the duty owed in contract adminis-
tration, imposing heavier burdens on the union in the latter context.95
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1132.
90. Id. at 1132-33.
91. 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
92. O'Neill, 111 S. Ct. at 1133.
93. Id. at 1133-34.
94. 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
95. See generally, JULIUS G. GETMAN & BERTRAND B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS, THE
BASIC PROCESSES. LAW AND PRACTICE 186-90 (1988).
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The Court said, however, that none of its decisions had suggested such
a double standard. Moreover, the Court said it doubted whether a
bright line could be drawn between the union's two principal functions
of contract administration and negotiation. Thus, the Court said that
the tripartite standard of Vaca - arbitrariness, capriciousness, and
bad faith - applied both to contract administration and to contract
negotiation. 96
Even though it agreed with the Fifth Circuit about which standard
of review applied, the Court reversed the appellate court's decision be-
cause its analysis of the union's conduct was too intrusive into the sub-
stance of negotiations. Although courts have some responsibility to
scrutinize union conduct, the Court viewed this power as clearly lim-
ited, likening the relationship to that existing between courts and legis-
latures.97 Thus, "the final product of the bargaining process may con-
stitute evidence of a breach of duty only if it can be fairly
characterized as so far outside a wide range of reasonableness . . . that
it is wholly irrational and arbitrary. '98 In particular, the Court cau-
tioned that the courts of appeals should remember the strong federal
policy favoring peaceful resolution of labor disputes. It also stressed
.that the rationality of the union's conduct had to be evaluated "in the
light of both the facts and the legal climate that confronted the negoti-
ators at the time the decision was made."
99
In the final section of the opinion the Court specifically addressed
the court of appeals finding that the union's action was arbitrary be-
cause its settlement with Continental was worse for the employees than
the effects of an outright surrender. In language that will no doubt
become important to unions, the Court said that a settlement is "not
irrational merely because, it turns out in retrospect, to have been a bad
settlement." 100 Rather, the Court said it was necessary to look at the
"legal landscape" at the time the union acted.01
In this case, the legal landscape included litigation in another fed-
eral court. The problem, however, was that the Northern District of
Illinois, in a case involving the same union and United Airlines, had
ruled in the union's favor.102 Moreover, the court of appeals had ob-
served that previous Supreme Court decisions about the importance of
96. O'Neill, 11I S. Ct. at 1135.
97. Id.








seniority in dealing with replacements and returning strikers (the Erie
Resistor0 3 line of cases) should have alerted the union to the weakness
of the company's position." 4 Thus, the "legal landscape" seemed as if
it were groomed to favor the union and therefore raised questions about
how it could abandon rights seemingly already conferred by judicial
action.
The Supreme Court was unmoved. It observed that at the time the
union acted, the decision from the Northern District of Illinois was on
appeal and could have been overturned. 5 Moreover, Erie Resistor and
similar cases were constructions of the National Labor Relations Act,
which did not necessarily apply to O'Neill since O'Neill arose under
the Railway Labor Act.' This was not a particularly convincing ob-
servation.10 7 Nevertheless, the Court said the union reasonably could
have thought that any attempt to concede the strike and seek immedi-
ate reinstatement could have provoked litigation. Thus, it was not un-
reasonable to negotiate for a share of the available work in order to'
avoid that result.' 0 8
As further evidence of reasonableness, the Court pointed to those
employees who elected lump sum payments in lieu of a return to work,
an advantage that would not have been available to them had the union
merely surrendered. Given its construction of the legal landscape and
the financial benefit to the pilots who settled, the Court concluded that
the union's conduct was within the "wide range of reasonableness"
standard of Ford Motor Company v. Huffman.'0 9
Finally, the Court rejected the appellate court's observation that
the union's action discriminated against striking employees." 0 Because
the Court found it reasonable for the union to agree to a compromise
between the class of striking pilots and those who worked during the
strike, it said that "some form of allocation was inevitable.""' More-
over; the Court observed that under Erie Resistor, the union would
have understood that the agreement did nothing more than allocate the
103. N.L.R.B. v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
104. ONeill, 111 S. Ct. at 1137.
105. Id. at 1136.
106. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988).
107. The Court created the duty of fair representation in a Railway Labor Act case. Steele
v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). It extended the same rationale to the NLRA
eleven years later. Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union Local No. 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955).
108. O'Neill, 111 S. Ct. at 1137.
109. Id.; Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 330 (1953).
110. O.Neill, 111 S. Ct. at 1137.
111. Id.
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method of: reintegration; once back on the job, the striking pilots would
enjoy the benefits of their greater seniority."'
The lessons of O'Neill are not easily understood. The Court does
say that the arbitrariness standard of the duty of fair representation
applies to unions in their collective bargaining role.11 3 Moreover, and
obviously of concern to unions, it allows courts to scrutinize the results
of collective bargaining'as a way of determining whether the union's
decision was arbitrary. But, it is hard to see how any union that acts in
good faith could ever act in an arbitrary manner, thus raising a ques-
tion about whether this decision has any effect at all since bad faith
negotiation already was acknowledged as a breach of the duty of fair
representation. In this case, for example, if one assumes as the Court
did, that the settlement hurt the employees more than a surrender
would have, the "legal landscape" provided scant support for the
union's conduct. The law seemed clearly favorable to the union. Thus,
the inference is that, if the union reasonably believes the employer will
litigate, regardless of the strength of its claim, it is rational for the
union to buy peace, even at the expense of other employees.
The principal effect of the case will be to encourage litigation by
disgruntled employees' and their lawyers who want to test the limits of
the Court's decision. After all, the Court said that the arbitrariness
standard applies in collective bargaining and authorized at least some
review of negotiation results in making that determination. 14 Granted,
the Court's opinion tried to limit the scope of judicial review, but ap-
pellate courts sometimes exercise the power granted by Supreme Court
opinions without grasping the accompanying limitations. Therefore,-un-
ions then should be legitimately concerned about the extent to which
the product of bargaining will be used as evidence of the adequacy of
their representation.
B. Discrimination Cases
1. UAW v. Johnson Controls
Although the Court unanimously assented to the judgment, one of
the most controversial cases before the Court in 1991 was UAW v.
Johnson Controls,' 5 which concerned the company's fetal protection
policy. The Court struck down the policy by a vote of 9-0, but only 5
members joined in all aspects of the majority opinion.
112. Id. Interestingly, this was the same Erie Resistor whose application the union could
reasonably have doubted when agreeing to make the deal in the first place. Id.
113. Id. at 1136.
114. Id.
115. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (interim ed. 1991).
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Johnson Controls produces batteries and exposure to lead is an in-
evitable consequence of the production process. 116 Prior to the enact-
ment of Title VII, 1' 7 the company refused to employ women in battery
manufacturing jobs. In 1977, however, the company eased the restric-
tion, though it continued to discourage women from such employment
and it required them to sign a waiver." 8 In 1982, the company re-
turned to its policy of exclusion, which applied to "all women capable
of bearing children." This included every woman save those whose in-
ability to bear children was "medically documented."' 19
The plaintiffs - which included a woman who chose to be steril-
ized, a woman who was transferred to a lower-paying job, and a man
who wahted a leave of absence to reduce his lead level in order to be-
come a father - filed a class action in 1984.12 The district court ap-
plied a three-part business necessity test and granted summary judg-
ment for the company.' 2'
In the trial court's view, the appropriate test asked whether there
was a health risk to the fetus, whether transmission of the risk could
occur only among women, and whether there was a less discriminatory
alternative. The trial court granted summary judgment for the em-
ployer, finding the existence of a threat to the fetus from lead exposure
and the failure of petitioners to establish an alternative policy that
would protect the fetus. Because the company had mounted its defense
successfully, the trial court said it was unnecessary to consider whether
the company's practice was a bona fide occupational qualification. 22
The Seventh Circuit, by a 7-4 decision, agreed that Johnson Con-
trols had satisfied the three-part business necessity test. But unlike the
district court, the court of appeals found that the fetal protection policy
also satisfied the more stringent bona fide occupational qualification de-
fense. Observing that more was at issue than the individual woman's
decision to bear the risk, the court said that industrial safety was an
essential part of defendant's business and that the fetal protection pol-
icy was reasonably necessary to further safety concerns.'2 3 This deci-
sion put the Seventh Circuit squarely in conflict with the Fourth and
Eleventh circuits, thus leading to the Supreme Court's grant of
certiorari.124
116- Id. at 1197.
117. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17 (1988).
118. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1199.
119. Id. at 1199-1200.
120. Id. at 1200.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1200-01.
124. Id. at 1202.
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The Court considered first the proper method of analyzing the
case. The Seventh Circuit assumed that the business necessity defense
was the appropriate vehicle because the employer's policy was not dis-
criminatory on its face; rather, the fetal protection policy was facially
neutral, but had a disparate impact on the employment of women. A
majority of the Supreme Court said this analysis was incorrect. It said
the policy was facially discriminatory because it applied only to
women. Despite at least some evidence of risk, men were not required
to produce evidence of infertility before being allowed to work. 12 5
The Court found support for its conclusion in the Pregnancy Disa-
bility Act of 1978 (PDA). 26 The PDA states that discrimination on
the basis of sex, as those terms are used in Title VII, includes discrimi-
nation "because of or on the basis of pregnancy . *.". . "I The Johnson
Controls policy, which applied to all women capable of bearing chil-
dren, was thus explicit sex discrimination since the employer had cho-
sen to treat all women as potentially pregnant. It was also no defense
that the employer had no evil motive. The Court said disparate treat-
ment depends not on motivation but rather on the "explicit terms of the
discrimination." 128
The Court's classification of the employer's action as disparate
treatment effectively removed'the business necessity defense. The only
possible defense left to Johnson Controls was bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ), which the court of appeals said the employer
had established. The Supreme Court disagreed. It noted that the de-
fense is narrowly written and narrowly construed. It also placed partic-
ular significance on the term "occupational" as modifying qualification.
The Court said this construction made it clear that the defense could
be used only for job-related skills and abilities. 29
Relying principally on Dothard v. Rawlinson,130 Johnson Controls
argued that its policy fell within a safety exception under the BFOQ.13 1
In Dothard, the Court observed the potential danger to other guards
and to inmates if female guards were unable to maintain security.132
The defense was also present in Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell,133 a
1985 ADEA case involving the forced retirement of flight engineers.
Focusing on the concern evidenced for third parties in both Dothard
125. Id. at 1203.
126. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
127. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1203.
128. Id. at 1203-04.
129. Id. at 1204.
130. 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (the prison guard case).
131. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1204.
132. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335.
133. 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
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and Criswell, Johnson Controls asserted that it was permissible to con-
sider the safety of fetuses, who are, or could be, endangered third
parties. 34
Again, the Court disagreed. The third parties in Dothard (the in-
mates) and Criswell (the passengers) were "indispensable to the partic-
ular business at issue."'"" Thus, the concern about safety was clearly
job-related. Indeed, it was the employer's business to provide for the
safety of inmates in Dothard and passengers in Criswell. The same
could not be said for a fetus whose mother manufactures batteries.
Rather, the Court said the BFOQ safety exception was limited to situa-
tions in which sex actually interfered with a woman's ability to perform
the job: "The BFOQ . . . is not so broad that it transforms this deep
social concern into an essential aspect of battery-making.' 1 36
The Court found more support for its interpretation of Title VII in
the PDA, which requires that pregnant employees be treated like all
others, unless their condition affects their ability to do the work.1 37 The
Court said that both Title VII and the Pregnancy Disability Act pre-
vent an employer from excluding women from employment opportuni-
ties because of their capacity to become pregnant, unless "reproductive
potential prevents her from performing the duties of the job.' 3 8 There
was no evidence that fertile women were less able to manufacture bat-
teries than anyone else.' 39
The majority closed its opinion with a short discussion about the
potential for tort liability, which undoubtedly played a role in Johnson
Controls' decision to adopt its fetal -protection policy. The Court noted
that OSHA had not excluded women from jobs involving lead expo-
sure. The Court said that, barring negligence, employers should be
shielded from liability since Title VII bans sex-specific policies, espe-
cially if the employer fully informs women of the risk. The Court ac-
knowledged that employment of fertile women could lead to financial
exposure and thus impose an extra cost on employers. But, it said it
had previously held that "the incremental cost of hiring women cannot
justify discrimination against them. '"140
Justice White wrote a separate opinion which was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist 'and Justice Kennedy. 4' Justice White agreed with
134. Johnson Controls, III S. Ct. at 1205.
135: Id.
136. Id. at 1206.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1207.
139. Id. at 1206-07.
140. Id. at 1208-09.
141. Id. at 1210 (white J., concurring).
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the majority's conclusion that Johnson Controls could justify its policy
on'ly as a bona fide occupational qualification. He disagreed, however,
that the defense was so narrow that it could never justify a sex-specific
fetal protection policy. 41 In particular, Justice White disagreed with
the majority's conclusion that cost was irrelevant. In that regard, he
refused to accept the majority's assumption that the possibility of em-
ployer tort liability was remote. 143 Nevertheless, Justice White agreed
with the majority's conclusion that the specific policy under review was
invalid.
2. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian Ameri-
can Oil Company
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian
American Oil Company, 4 4 the Court decided that Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964145 does not protect American citizens who
work for American employers abroad. 4" The plaintiff was a United
States citizen who had been born in Lebanon. At the time of his dis-
charge, he was employed by Arabian American Oil Company in Saudi
Arabia. He claimed that his employer's action against him was moti-
vated by discrimination on account of race, religion and national
origin.147
The Court acknowledged that Congress has the authority to re-
quire enforcement of statutes beyond U.S. boundaries. The Court, how-
ever, cited what it called the long standing principle that, unless a con-
trary intent is apparent, laws are "meant to apply only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States."' 14 8 That presumption can
be overcome only by the "affirmative intention of Congress clearly ex-
pressed."' 49 The plaintiff and the EEOC argued that two provisions of
Title VII demonstrated a Congressional intent to legislate beyond terri-
torial boundaries. The first concerned the statutory definitions of the
terms "employer" and "commerce." 1 5°
The plaintiffs argued that because the statute defined commerce to
include trade "between a state and any place outside thereof," the
terms of the statute -itself revealed a congressional intent to protect
Americans working for U.S. employers abroad. The 'Court found this
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1213-14.
144. 111 S. Ct. 1227 (interim ed. 1991).
145. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17 (1988).
146. Arabian, 111 S. Ct. at 1227.
147. Id. at 1230-31.
148. Id. at 1230 (quoting Foley Bros. Inc. v Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
149. Id. (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957)).
150. Id. at 1231.
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reading "plausible, but no more persuasive than that." '151 The Court
dismissed the statutory language as "boiler plate" which appeared in
several statutes and which had never been held to apply outside the
United States. Moreover, the Court noted previous decisions in which
even references to "foreign" commerce had not indicated an intention
to provide extraterritorial coverage. "' It also distinguished a 1952 deci-
sion "'53 in which a statute was held to apply outside the United States
by noting that in that case, the term commerce was defined as "all
commerce that may lawfully be regulated by Congress,"'" a definition
the Court found significantly broader.
The plaintiff's second argument was more difficult and, in fact,
was never really addressed by the Court. The plaintiffs contended that
Title VII's alien exception provision manifested a clear intention by
Congress to protect United States citizens working abroad for Ameri-
can employers. The exemptions provide that Title VII "shall not apply
to an employer with respect to employment of aliens outside any
state."' 55 Obviously, there would be no reason to exempt aliens working
abroad if the statute had no extraterritorial application. Thus, the in-
ference, argued the plaintiffs, is that Congress must have intended ex-
traterritorial coverage from which only aliens were exempted."
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, did not address
this argument directly. He merely said that, should plaintiffs be correct
in their assertion that the statute applies overseas, "we see no way of
distinguishing in its application between U.S. employers and foreign
employers.' 57 But, he added that attempting to regulate the employ-
ment practices of foreign employers would "raise difficult issues of in-
ternational law."'5 8 By raising a shadow argument, the Court was able
to argue that it should interpret the statute to avoid such international
entanglements, at least absent clearer evidence of congressional intent.
The Court buttressed this conclusion by pointing to several parts of the
statute that suggested "a purely domestic focus."' 59
Finally, the EEOC argued that the Court should defer to its con-
sistent interpretation of Title VII as applying extraterritorially. Unlike
the NLRB, the EEOC has no administrative rule-making power,' 60 a
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1232.
153. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
154. 15 U.S.C. § 127 (1988).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1988).
156. Arabian, 11I S. Ct. at 1123.
157. Id. at 1234.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1235-36.
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limitation that has not prevented it from issuing "interpretive guide-
lines" that resemble regulations.
The Court has said that the EEOC guidelines do not necessarily
receive the same deference as regulations promulgated by other agen-
cies. Rather, their persuasive effect depends on several factors, includ-
ing the thoroughness and consistency of the reasoning. But, that stan-
dard was of no value to the EEOC in this case since its interpretation
had not been consistent. Initially, the EEOC suggested that the scope
of the statute was domestic only. Its opinion did not change for twenty-
four years and, importantly, the EEOC offered "no basis in its experi-
ence for the change."''
The Court concluded that Congress knew how to extend the reach
of its statute when it wanted to do so. It found insufficient evidence of
such an intention in this case.162
3. Irwin v. Veterans Administration
In Irwin v. Veterans Administration,63 the plaintiff contended
that his discharge from federal government service was motivated by
race and physical disability discrimination. Initially, he filed charges
with the EEOC, which dismissed the charge by letter of March 19,
1987. The letter was sent both to Irwin and to his attorney, who ap-
peared for him in the EEOC investigation.164
As required by law, the dismissal letter informed Irwin of his right
to sue under Title VII within 30 days of receipt. Irwin claimed that he
did not receive the letter until April 7, 1987. The letter was delivered
to his attorney's office, however, on March 23, 1987. His attorney did
not actually see the letter until April 10, 1987 when he returned from a
trip out of the country. Irwin's complaint was filed in federal district
court on May 6, 1987.165
One issue in the case, consequently, was whether the complaint
was timely filed within the 30-day period following receipt of the
EEOC dismissal notice. Irwin argued that the 30 days should be
counted from the time he actually received the letter. The district court
disagreed, an action that the Fifth Circuit affirmed.' 66 The Supreme
Court agreed. The statute, the Court observed, requires only that the
161. Id. at 1235.
162. Id. at 1235-36. Justice Scalia concurred with all but that part of the opinion dealing
with the deference owed EEOC interpretive guidelines. Justice Marshall dissented, in an opinion
joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens.
163. 111 S. Ct. 453 (interim ed. 1990).
164. Id. at 455.
165. Id.
166. Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 874 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1989).
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notice be "received." It does, not say that receipt by an attorney of
record will not suffice. Moreover, the Court said that requiring actual
receipt by the litigant would render notification of counsel a "meaning-
less exercise." 1 7 Finally, the Court said the crucial time was the date
of delivery to the attorney's office, not the date when the notice actually
came to the lawyer's attention.168
A finding that the action had not been filed within the 30-day stat-
utory period did not, however, resolve the matter. Irwin contended that
his late filing could be excused through equitable tolling principles.
Both the district court and the court of appeals had rejected that argu-
ment. Because the portion of Title VII authorizing suits against the
federal government is a waiver of sovereign immunity, the court of ap-
peals said that strict compliance with statutory time limits was essen-
tial. Indeed, the appellate court said that the limit was jurisdictional
and failure to observe it precluded the court from even considering an
equitable claim. 16 9
The Supreme Court disagreed, thus resolving what it acknowl-
edged were inconsistent pronouncements on the issue. In fact, the
Court said it was promulgating a "general rule to govern the applica-
bility of equitable tolling in suits against the government. 17 0 The rule
is easy to state - the Court said that in suits against the government
the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applies that ap-
plies in suits against private parties.1 71
Even so, the new rule was of no help to Irwin. The Court said that
such equitable relief had been extended only sparingly and generally
had not been available when the claimant merely failed to exercise dili-
gence. Describing the facts at issue as "a garden variety laim of ex-
cusable neglect," the Court found no warrant for tolling the 30-day
filing period. 7 2
4. Gregory v. Ashcroft
The Missouri Constitution requires that most of the state's judges
retire at age seventy." 3 Seemingly in conflict with that provision is the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which makes it unlawful for
167. Irwin, 111 S. Ct. at 456.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 457.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 458. Justice White, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred by separate opinion.
Id. at 458-60. Justice Stevens dissented from the Court's holding that the thirty day period began
to run when Irwin's lawyer received the EEOC letter. Id. at 460-61.
173. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 26. The Missouri Constitution provides, in part: "All judges
other than municipal judges shall retire at the age of seventy years." Id.
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an employer to discharge any individual who is forty or older because
of his or her age.174 States and their political subdivisions are included
within the term "employer" as defined in the ADEA.17 5 In Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 171 the Supreme Court considered and rejected a challenge by
state judges to the enforceability of the state constitution's mandatory
retirement provision.
Although seven justices concurred in the judgment, only four
others joined Justice O'Connor in her majority opinion. In a concurring
opinion, Justice White, joined by Justice Stevens, asserted that the
Court granted certiorari only to decide whether Missouri state judges
are "appointees on the policymaking level" 177 as that terminology is
used in the ADEA 1 78 If so, they are excluded from the Act's reach.
Although he agreed with the majority's resolution of the case, Justice
White asserted that Justice O'Connor's opinion did not resolve that is-
sue of statutory construction.1 79 Instead, the majority concentrated on
issues of federalism, which it said required an analysis of whether Con-
gress actually meant the ADEA to embrace state court judges.
The first part of Justice O'Connor's opinion reviews much of the
history of what she called "a system of dual sovereignty.' 80 She ob-
served that the federal government is one of limited powers and that,
pursuant to the Tenth Amendment, powers not delegated to the federal
government are reserved to the states. This dual system, she said, "pre-
serves to the people numerous advantages," the principal one of which
"is a check on the abuses of government power."1 81 The separation of
powers between the federal and state governments reduces the risk of
tyranny by either.
For this system to work, Justice O'Connor said, there must be a
"proper balance" between federal and state governments, though ad-
mittedly, "the federal government holds a decided advantage." 182 Ironi-
cally, it was that statement of obvious fact that made the difference in
this case. Because the supremacy clause of the federal constitution af-
fords such "extraordinary power," the assumption is that Congress acts
174. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a), 631(a) (1988).
175. Id., § 630(b)(2).
176. 111 S. Ct. 2395 (interim ed. 1991).
177. The ADEA definition of "employee" excludes from the Act's coverage, among others,
"an appointee on the policymaking level" of state or local governments. 29 U.S.C. § 630(f)
(1988).
178. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2408.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 2399.
181. Id. at 2399-2400.
182. Id. at 2400.
[VOL. 17:1
EMPLOYMENT LAW DECISIONS
with considerable caution, at least when it intrudes on matters ordina-
rily left to the states. 8 '
The provision at issue in this case - who should sit as judges in
the state's courts - was "of the most fundamental sort for a sovereign
entity."' 8' Intervention in such matters by the federal government
would interfere with the balance Justice O'Connor viewed as essential
for a federalist system to survive. Thus, before applying the ADEA to
invalidate a provision of the Missouri Constitution, Congress must
make its intention to do so "unmistakably clear.' 8 5 In short, Justice
O'Connor and a five person majority required a "plain statement" from
Congress that it intended the ADEA to apply to the forced retirement
of state court judges.' 86
There is no such "plain statement" in the ADEA. Moreover, the
majority cites no part of the legislative history of the ADEA, unlike
Justice White in his concurring opinion187 and Justice Blackmun in his
dissenting opinion.'88 Instead, the majority merely parses the language
of the statute, which it conceded was ambiguous.'8 That fact, however,
assured the exclusion of state judges from the ADEA.
The Act excludes from the definition of "employee" elected public
officials, personal staff members of such officials, and appointees at the
policy making level of state or local government. One issue the Court
did not resolve is whether Missouri judges - most of whom are ap-
pointed by the governor and stand periodically for unopposed retention
votes - are elected public officials for purposes of the ADEA. The
Court did not reach that issue because it found that state judges are
policy making officials and, therefore, are exempt from coverage in any
event.
Petitioners contended that, as state judges, they do not make pol-
icy; rather, they merely apply state policy in particular cases. More-
over, in a contention the Court recited but never addressed, petitioners
claimed that the structure of the Act revealed that the only policy mak-
ers who are "employees" under the Act are those chosen for the staff of
an elected official or those who otherwise work -as advisors for such
officials. 9 ° The state countered by claiming that in a common law state
183. Id. at 2401.
184. Id. at 2400.
185. Id. at 2395 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
186. Id. at 2401.
187. Id. at 2412-14 (White, J., concurring).
188. Id. at 2416-18 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 2404.
190. The petitioners noted that the exemption for policymakers was contained in a listing of
such exemptions, all of which were seemingly related to elected officials. Thus, petitioners claimed
that the Court should apply a maxim of statutory construction called noscitur a sociis, which the
Court described as "a word is known by the company it keeps." Id. at 2403.
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like Missouri, judges do make policy. Moreover, some state judges play
significant roles in the supervision of inferior courts and the state
bar.91
The Court said it did not matter whether state judges actually
made policy. The statute does not refer expressly to policymakers.
Rather, it speaks to those on the "policymaking level," a description
satisfied by state court judges. The Court conceded that use of the ter-
minology "appointee[s] on the policymaking level" was an unusual way
for Congress to exclude state judges from the reach of the ADEA.9 2
Nevertheless, the question was not so much whether Congress meant to
exclude judges; it was whether it meant to include them. Because most
important state officials are excluded from the ADEA, and because ap-
pointees on the "policymaking level" could embrace state judges, the
Court was satisfied that there was no congressional intent to include
judges within the scope of the ADEA.'93
The Court then turned to whether its analysis would differ if it
assumed that Congress had extended the ADEA to state and local em-
ployees pursuant to its power under the Fourteenth Amendment rather
than the Commerce Clause. The Court conceded that, because the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to intrude on the exercise of
state power, congressional actions under that provision are less "attenu-
ated" than when Congress acts pursuant to the Commerce Clause. 94
Even so, the Court said that congressional power under the Fourteenth
Amendment could not be applied without regard for a state's constitu-
tional powers: "[previous cases] demonstrate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not override the principles of federalism."' 95
The Court reviewed its previous decision in Parkhurst State
School and Hospital v. Halderman96 in which the federal government
argued that the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act 9 7 was adopted pursuant to congressional .power under the
Fourteenth Amendment and therefore applied to all states, whether or
not they received federal funds. The Court observed that such legisla-
tion could impose the federal will in violation of traditional state au-
thority. Thus, the Court said it would find that Congress acted pursu-
ant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment only when its intent to
191. Id. at 2403-04.
192. Id. at 2404.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 2405.
195. Id.
196. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
197. 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1988).
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do so was clear. 198 There was, however, no such clarity in whether state
judges were to be covered under the ADEA. 199
In the final section of its opinion, the majority rejected petitioners'
claim that, even if they were not protected by the ADEA, the state's
mandatory retirement rule violated the equal protection clause. The
Court noted, as it has held before, that age is not a suspect classifica-
tion.2"' Thus, the appropriate test was whether there was a rational
basis for the state's action:
[W]e will not overturn such a [law] unless the varying treatment of dif-
ferent groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of legitimate-
purposes that we can only conclude that the [people's] actions were
irrational."0 1
Having announced the test, the Court had little difficulty justify-
ing the Missouri rule. Indeed, the Missouri Supreme Court had
thoughtfully supplied numerous justifications in a 1978 opinion uphold-
ing a similar challenge to a state statute that applied to magistrates
and probate judges.202 Justice O'Connor wrote delicately for a court
several of whose own members were past age seventy. It is an unfortu-
nate fact, she said, that age is sometimes an accurate barometer of
physical and mental ability. Not all judges face significant deteriora-
tion after age seventy - indeed, maybe none do. But the people of
Missouri, who were less able to ensure continued competence in judges
than in other more visible state officials, could reasonably believe that
some of them would be affected by age. Thus, they could rationally
require all of them to retire at age seventy.203
5. Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Solimino
In Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Solimino,"°4
the Court considered whether judicially unreviewed findings of a state
administrative agency had a preclusive effect in a subsequent Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act action filed in federal court. The plain-
tiff was a sixty-three year old Astoria employee who claimed that his
discharge violated the ADEA. The plaintiff filed a timely charge of age
discrimination with the EEOC. In accordance with a working agree-
ment, the EEOC referred the charge to the New York State Division
of Human Rights, which held an evidentiary hearing at which both
employer and employee were represented by counsel.20 5
198. Gregory, II1 S. Ct. at 2405-06.
199. Id. at 2406.
200. Id.
201. .Id. (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)).
202. O'Neil v. Baine, 568 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1978).
203. Gregory, 11I S. Ct. at 2407-08.
204. 111 S. Ct. 2166 (interim ed. 1991).
205. Id. at 2168-69.
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The state agency found no probable cause to believe that the em-
ployer's action was prompted by age discrimination. The state Human
Rights Appeals Board affirmed this finding. The plaintiff apparently
could have sought judicial review in state court, but elected instead to
file in federal district court an ADEA action grounded on the same
allegations. Relying on the common law presumption of administrative
estoppel, the district court granted summary judgment for the em-
ployer. The Second Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve a conflict between the circuits.2 0 6
The Court began by noting its longstanding recognition of the
common law doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata. Such def-
erence, it said, was justified because "a losing litigant deserves no
rematch after a defeat fairly suffered. ' 0 7 Whether the doctrine applies
to statutory actions, however, is not merely a matter of federal policy.
Rather, the question is one of congressional intent. Even here, however,
Congress should be assumed to have acted against a background of
common law adjudicatory principles. Thus, the principle of preclusion
applies, absent some congressional intention to the contrary. That does
not mean, however, that Congress must "state precisely" its intention
to reject the principle of collateral estoppel. 2°s
The Court compared the issue in Astoria to the one it had decided
five years previously in University of Tennessee v. Elliot.209 In that
case, the Court found a congressional intent to avoid the common law
rules of preclusion because the statute said in express terms only that
the EEOC should accord "substantial weight" to findings made by
state and local agencies.210 Since the agency itself was not precluded by
state administrative action, the Court reasoned that federal courts
could not be precluded either.21
There is no similar "substantial weight" language in the ADEA,
but the Court found that the statute "carries an implication" that fed-
eral courts 'are not to -recognize preclusion for state administrative
agency findings. 2 2 The Court based this conclusion on the filing re-
quirements established by the ADEA. When states have their own age
discrimination laws, section 14(b)21 3 requires claimants to first pursue
206. Id. at 2169.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 2169-70.
209. 478 U.S. 788 (1986).
210. Id. at 795.
211. Id.
212. Astoria, 111 S. Ct. at 2171.
213. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1988).
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the claim through that avenue before going to federal court. No such
action can be filed until 60 days after the initiation of state review.
Moreover, complainants can file with the EEOC within 300 days of the
alleged discrimination or within 30 days after termination of state pro-
ceedings.214 Both provisions, the Court said, contemplated the possibil-
ity of consideration by federal agencies or federal courts after state re-
view was finished.215
The Court observed that, in most cases, those who sought federal
relief after termination of state proceedings would be complainants who
had failed at the state level. If the state proceedings were preclusive,
however, the federal action would be merely pro forma. The employer
would enjoy an "airtight defense" since the state would already have
decided the case on the merits. This would "reduce to insignificance"
the volume of federal cases. The Court said that it would not construe
the statute so as to render it superfluous.216
Thus, the Court decided that the presumption in favor of adminis-
trative estoppel had no application to state administrative findings in
subsequent ADEA litigation. A contrary holding would leave claimants
at the mercy of bureaucratic chance, since not all states have state pro-
ceedings. Moreover, it would induce claimants to file federal actions at
the earliest opportunity, thus denying the states their legitimate role in
trying to settle cases outside the federal system. 217
Finally, the Court noted the limitations of its decision. The deci-
sion applies only to state agency determinations which are not reviewed
judicially. Moreover, while not preclusive, the state agency's findings
are at least admissible in evidence. 8
6. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation
Although the holding itself may not be of great significance to
traditional labor law, the Court's 1991 decision in Gilmer v. Interstatel
Johnson Lane Corporation21 9 may result in the use of arbitration for
new claims arising out of the employment relationship. The case con-
cerned the relationship between arbitration and actions under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.220 The kind of arbitration at issue
in Gilmer, however, is not traditional labor arbitration, so often found
214. Id. §§ 7(d)(2), 626(d)(2).
215. Astoria, 111 S. Ct. at 2171.
216. Id. at 2171-72.
217. Id. at 2172.
218. Id.
219. 111 S. Ct. 1647 (interim ed. 1991).
220. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
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in collective bargaining agreements and so frequently the subject of Su-
preme Court decisions. Instead, the case involved a commercial arbitra-
tion held pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act,"' although the
agreement to arbitrate appeared in an employment contract.
The case involved a sixty-two year old securities firm employee
who, as a condition of employment, had signed an agreement to arbi-
trate any dispute that arose out of his employment. He was fired in
1987 and thereafter filed an ADEA charge with the EEOC. He then
filed an age discrimination action in the Western District of North
Carolina. The employer responded by filing a motion to compel arbitra-
tion, relying on the plaintiff's signed agreement and the Federal Arbi-
tration Act (FAA). The district court denied the motion, but the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, 222 an action affirmed by the
Supreme Court.
The Court said that Congress had adopted the FAA as a way of
erasing the traditional hostility between common law courts and arbi-
tration and as a way of making arbitration agreements enforceable. 223
Moreover, the Court reviewed previous decisions which made clear that
a statutory claim could be made the subject of an arbitration under the
FAA. Although all statutory claims may not be appropriate for arbitra-
tion, the plaintiff who seeks to avoid arbitration must prove that Con-
gress did not intend to allow the federal courts to be divested of juris-
diction in ADEA cases. 224
The Court agreed that the ADEA was intended to further impor-
tant social policies, but said there was no inconsistency between that
goal and the use of arbitration. In addition, the use of arbitration did
not undermine the EEOC's role. Individuals are still free to file charges
and, even if they do not, the EEOC can investigate based on informa-
tion received from other sources. Perhaps more important, the Court
said "nothing in the ADEA indicates that Congress intended that the
EEOC be involved in all employment disputes. 22 5 This language un-
doubtedly will find its way into employers' briefs in other cases.
The Court then rejected a number of specific attacks on the arbi-
tration process itself, including a claim that arbitrators might not be
impartial. Citing its 1985 opinion in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
221. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988). This statute does not govern arbitration agreements con-
tained in labor contracts. Rather, the law regulating what has come to be known as labor arbitra-
tion is fashioned by the federal courts pursuant to section 301 of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988); see. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1957).
222. Gilmer, Ill S. Ct. at 1651.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1653.
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Chrysler Plymouth,226 the Court said it would not assume that arbitra-
tors would be either biased or incompetent. The parties would have am-
ple opportunity to inquire into the background of potential arbitrators,
and the arbitrators were required to disclose any potential conflicts.227
The Court also discounted the possibility that inequality between the
employee and the employer might effectively force employees into arbi-
tration agreements against their will. The Court said there was no
showing that plaintiff was coerced into the agreement. 28 Moreover,
"mere inequality in bargaining power . . . is not a sufficient reason to
hold that arbitration -agreements are never enforceable in the employ-
ment context. 229
The Court then addressed the plaintiff's principal argument. In
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,230 the Court held that losing a labor
arbitration case on the merits did not preclude an employee from liti-
gating the same facts in federal court in a subsequent Title VII pro-
ceeding. Although courts might elect to give weight to arbitral findings,
they are not required to defer. Nor are the parties precluded from relit-
igating factual matters already resolved by the arbitrator.
In Gilmer, the plaintiff argued that it made no sense to require
him to arbitrate his age discrimination case since he could later file an
action in federal court.23 1 In that event, citing Gardner-Denver,3 2 the
previous arbitration would be meaningless. The Court, however, dis-
agreed. It distinguished labor arbitration - the subject of Gardner-
Denver - and the arbitration procedures that apply under the FAA,
which does not apply to labor arbitration cases.
Labor arbitrators, the Court observed, are confined to contractual
issues. Although parties might presumably agree to let arbitrators re-
solve other claims, in the typical case their authority is confined to in-
terpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Thus, in Gardner-
Denver and the cases that followed, the unsuccessful employee who had
lost a contract dispute in arbitration was not precluded from pursuing
his statutory claim in court.2 33 Arbitration under the FAA, however, is
not labor arbitration and the parties have not agreed to limit the arbi-
trator's authority to contractual claims. Moreover, the FAA reflects a
226. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
227. Gilmer, III S. Ct. at 1654. The court also dismissed or disagreed with plaintiff's con-
tentions that discovery is limited in arbitration, that arbitration awards may not be in writing, and
that arbitrators cannot issue broad equitable relief. Id. at 1654-55.
228. Id. at 1656.
229. Id. at 1655.
230. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
231. Gilmer, 11I S. Ct. at 1647.
232. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 36.
233. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1656-57.
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" 'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.' "234 Presuma-
bly, this policy includes arbitration of statutory claims, unlike the
Court's frequent reference to the broad federal policy favoring ar'bitra-
tion of disputes arising under collective bargaining agreements.
Although Gilmer is important in cases in which there are individ-
ual employment agreements containing arbitration clauses, it would
seem to have little effect in unionized workplaces. Employees in the
protected class under the ADEA may arbitrate claims under collective
bargaining agreements, but given the distinctions drawn between FAA
arbitration and labor arbitration, it is unlikely that those decisions will
preclude further litigation. Gardner-Denver still applies to arbitration
under collective bargaining agreements.
That does not mean, however, that the case is of only limited util-
ity. As the employment-at-will doctrine continues to erode, occasionally
with statutory assistance, some have suggested that the resulting em-
ployment litigation be funneled into arbitration instead of the courts.
Gilmer certainly does not require any such result, but it does provide
what may prove to be a significant endorsement of arbitration for dis-
putes between employers and individual employees.
7. Stevens v. Department of the Treasury
In Stevens v. Department of Treasury,35 the Court discussed
some of the procedural requirements for filing suits under the Age Dis-
crimination and Employment Act.236 The plaintiff was Charles Stevens,
an IRS employee who, at age sixty-three, was accepted into the reve-
nue officer training program. In April of 1987, after approximately
eight months in the program, the IRS demoted Stevens for unsatisfac-
tory service. In September of 1987, Stevens tried to invoke the agency's
administrative procedure for age discrimination complaints. Pertinent
regulations, however, provided that any such action had to be taken
within thirty days after the alleged discrimination. Stevens had waited
five months.13 7
In October of 1987, 176 days after his demotion, Stevens filed a
formal administrative complaint of age discrimination with the Depart-
ment of the Treasury. Included in the complaint was a statement of his
intention to sue if the matter was not resolved. The complaint was re-
jected because he had not initiated the proceedings within thirty days.
In May of 1988, Stevens filed an ADEA action in federal district
court.2 38
234. Id. at 1657 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, 473 U.S.
614, 625 (1985)).
235. 111 S. Ct. 1562 (interim ed. 1991).
236. Id. at 1565-66 (discussing 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988)).




The case required the Court to construe section 15(d) of the Age
Discrimination and Employment Act:
When the individual has not filed a complaint concerning age discrimi-
nation with the Commission, no civil action may be commenced by any
individual under this section until the individual has given the Commis-
sion not less than thirty days' notice of an intent to file such action. Such
notice shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged
unlawful practice occurred.2 3 9
The district court said that employees who believe they have been dis-
criminated against have two avenues for relief. First, they may proceed
directly to federal court, or second, they may file an administrative
complaint with the appropriate federal agency and appeal an adverse
finding to the EEOC. In that case, the court said employees could bring
a federal civil action only after exhausting administrative remedies. Be-
cause Stevens had tried to invoke his administrative remedies, and be-
cause his filing was untimely, the district court said that it was without
jurisdiction to hear the case. 4 °
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, but on different grounds. The district
court had said that any action based on the ADEA had to be filed not
later than 180 days from the alleged discrimination, relying on the last
sentence of section 15(b). The couirt of appeals correctly observed that
the statute did not require initiation of an action within 180 days of the
alleged discrimination. Rather, it required only that a complainant
serve notice of an intent to sue during that time period. However, the
court of appeals said the action had to be filed within thirty days. 241
The Supreme Court called this a clear misreading of the statute. It
agreed that there are two alternative routes for pursuing claims of age
discrimination; federal employees can invoke the EEOC's administra-
tive process or, alternatively, petition federal court in the first instance.
If they pursue their action in court in the first instance, they are re-
quired to file a notice with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged
discrimination. 242 Stevens did that here since he filed such a notice 176
days after the discrimination. Employees are not, however, required to
sue within thirty days. Rather, the notice has to be filed not less than
thirty days before the suit. Here, the plaintiff filed the notice on Octo-
ber 19, 1987 and filed his lawsuit on May 3, 1988. Thus, the case was
properly before the trial court.24 3
239. 29 U.S.C. § 633(a)(d) (1988).
240. Stevens, 111 S. Ct. at 1565.
241. Id. at 1566-67.
242. Id. at 1566.
243. Id. at 1567.
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The Court noted that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
does not contain, any statute of limitations. Therefore, the Court as-
sumed, as it has done with other federal statutes, that Congress in-
tended to borrow an appropriate limitations period from either federal
or state law. The Court said, however, that it did not need to decide
what the limitations period would be in this case because the plaintiff,
having filed his case only one year and six days after the alleged dis-
crimination, would be well within whatever statute might apply.""
The court of appeals also considered the issue of whether the
plaintiff was required to exhaust his administrative remedies before fil-
ing a civil action. Other federal courts have so held. The government
abandoned that position before the Supreme Court, however, which ac-
cordingly refused to consider the matter. 4 5 Justice Stevens, who con-
curred in all other parts of the opinion, dissented from that part. He
asserted that the ADEA contains no requirement of administrative
exhaustion. 4
C. Other Significant Cases
1. International Organization of Masters, Mates, and Pilots v. Brown
In International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots v.
Brown,24 7 the Court considered the reasonableness of a union's restric-
tion on the distribution of campaign literature. The union represents
8500 members in the maritime industry. It conducts elections every
four years by mail ballot. The union's election rules prohibit mailing of
campaign literature prior to the candidate's official nomination at the
union's nominating convention. " 8
About three months before the 1988 convention, Timothy Brown
notified the secretary-treasurer of the union that he planned to be a
candidate for union office and he requested mailing labels to conduct a
mailing at his own expense prior to the nominating convention. Follow-
ing a further exchange of correspondence, the union advised Brown
that its rules authorized mailing of campaign literature only after the
nominating convention. In particular, candidates were not allowed ac-
cess to union mailing lists until after the convention. Such access was
crucial in this case because union members work on board a ship and
realistically can be reached only by mail.24 9
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1657-68.
246. Id. at 1569.
247. 111 S. Ct. 880 (interim ed. 1991).
248. Id. at 883.
249. Id. at 883-84.
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Brown filed suit under section 401(c) of the Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA)2 50 which provides
that unions are to comply "with all reasonable requests of any candi-
date to distribute by mail . . . at the candidate's expense campaign
literature in aid of such persons candidacy to all members in good
standing .. ". . I" The district court entered a preliminary injunction,
ordering the delivery of the names and addresses to a mailing service
acceptable to the parties. Its decision was based on alternative grounds.
First, the court said Brown's request was clearly reasonable and
any rule that resulted in its denial was invalid. Second, the district
court held that even if the standard of review was the reasonableness of
the union rule, the rule was unreasonable because preconvention
campaigning was essential.2 52 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision. The majority, whose opinion
was adopted en banc, held that only the reasonableness of the request
was at issue, not the reasonableness of the union rule.25 3
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. Three
important issues were undisputed. First, the case was not moot despite
the fact that the election was over and Brown had lost. Second, Brown
qualified as a bona fide candidate under the meaning of the statute
when he made his request. Third, there was no basis for contending
that Brown's request was unreasonable within the meaning of section
401(c) except Brown's failure to comply with the union's rule.25'
The primary argument advanced by the union was the reasonable-
ness of its rule restricting distribution of literature until after the nomi-
nating convention. The Court dispensed with that claim quite easily,
however, by holding that the text and purpose of the statute required
consideration of the reasonableness of the candidate's request, not ex-
amination of the union's rule. The statute, for example, required the
union to comply with "all reasonable requests"; it said nothing about
requiring candidates to comply with reasonable union rules.2 55
The Court also found significance in other sections of the LMRDA
that did authorize promulgation of reasonable union rules. Failure to
enact such a provision governing the distribution of union literature led
the Court to conclude that the candidate's rights were "unqualified."
250. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-581 (1988).
251. Id. § 481(c).
252. Brown, 111 S. Ct. at 884-85.
253. Id. at 885.
254. Id. at 885-86.
255. Id. at 886-87.
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The Court also noted that its construction was consistent with the stat-
ute's purpose of reducing the communication advantages enjoyed by
incumbent union officers.2 56
The union also advanced three other arguments in support of its
position: (1) that rules like the one at issue were necessary to ensure a
fair election; (2) that the rule at issue helped avoid discrimination; and
(3) that the government should avoid unnecessary intervention in the
internal affairs of labor unions. The Court was unconvinced. Although
rules are essential to govern the election process, that did not justify
prohibiting candidate mailings before nomination. The Court also felt
that open communication was more likely to thwart discrimination than
to cause it. Finally, the Court noted that unlike some other provisions
of the LMDRA, section 401(c) was specifically designed to be intrusive
to unions' election proceedings.157
In the Court's view, the test was straightforward under section
401(c) and it hinged on the reasonableness of the candidate's request.
Since the union advanced no argument that the request was unreasona-
ble - other than the fact that it violated the union's rule - the Court
found that the request was reasonable and should have been granted.2 58
2. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association
In Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association,59 the Court returned to
a much litigated subject - the extent to which nonmembers can be
charged for activities of unions obligated by law to represent them. 60
In particular, the case concerned the constitutionality of certain contri-
butions authorized pursuant to state statute for public employees.2 "
The plaintiffs in Lehnert were faculty members at Ferris State College,
a public institution in Michigan. Although represented by the Ferris
Faculty Association, an NEA and MEA affiliate, plaintiffs chose not to
join. Thus, they were required to pay a service fee equivalent in amount
to the dues required for union members.2 62 Such agency shops are ex-
pressly authorized by the Michigan statute, the constitutionality of
which was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in 1977 in
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. 3
256. Id. at 887.
257. Id. at 887-88.
258. Id. at 888.
259. 111 S. Ct. 1950 (interim ed. 1991).
260. See, e.g., Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988); Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
261. The statue is part of the Michigan Public Employment Relations Act. MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 423.210 (West 1978). The particular provision at issue was section 423.210 which
authorized so-called agency shops under which non members must pay a service fee to the union.
262. Lehnert, I I 1 S. Ct. at 1955-56.
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In a separate opinion, Justice Scalia charged that the Court's ap-
proach to union service fee cases perpetuated "give-it-a-try litiga-
tion."2 4 This case may produce more of the same. Although it is possi-
ble to view what the Court said as permissible, it is more difficult to
provide a coherent - or at least a unified - explanation for its action.
The only member of the Court who was never in doubt was Justice
Marshall, who would have approved each expenditure the union made
and who obviously joined the majority for those expenditures the Court
approved.265 The rest of the Court split into two camps on most issues,
with Justice Blackmun writing the principal opinion and Justice Scalia
authoring another significant opinion. Justice Blackmun wrote the opin-
ion for the Court on most issues and was joined in all respects by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice Stevens. Justice Scalia's
opinion, which was joined by Justice O'Connor, Justice Souter, and
Justice Kennedy (on all but one issue), agreed with Justice Blackmun's
in some respects, but most often applied a different test to the matters
under review.
Justice Blackmun first reviewed the Court's decisions on similar
issues, some of them constructions of the Railway Labor Act. Even
though those were cases of statutory construction, Justice Blackmun
said they were relevant to the constitutional question presented in
Lehnert. In particular, he declared that expenses "germane" to the col-
lective bargaining role of unions can constitutionally be assessed
against public employees. "66
In Abood, the Court had acknowledged that forcing public em-
ployees to support collective bargaining representatives "has an impact
upon their First Amendment interests. '2 67 The impact is ordinarily not
sufficient to violate First Amendment rights, although the union clearly
could not force employees to contribute to political or ideological
causes. In Abood, the Court pointed to two considerations that justified
the First Amendment impact, namely the desirability of maintaining
labor peace and the elimination of free-riders.26 8
In the same case, the Court acknowledged that it did not draw a
"precise line" between legitimate and illegitimate assessments. In fact,
it asserted that the line for public sector employees might be "some-
what hazier" than for private sector workers, principally because of the
264. Lehnert, III S. Ct. at 1975 (Scalia, J.).
265. Id. at 1966-1975 (Marshall, J., concurring in part).
266. Id. at 1956-57.
267. 431 U.S. at 222.
268. Id. at 225-26.
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union's desire to influence legislative budgetary decisions that are part
of the bargaining process." 9
In Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 70 decided after Abood, the Court
found no First Amendment impediment to assessments intended to sup-
port various expenses in connection with conventions, publications, and
social events. None of the challenged charges supported ideological
causes. Moreover, none added significantly to the burden on First
Amendment rights already imposed, and constitutionally sanctioned by
the Court, by virtue of compulsory dues assessment. 1
Justice Blackmun, speaking on behalf of only five justices, de-
clared that chargeable union costs must meet a three prong test: first,
they must be germane to the union's collective bargaining actions; sec-
ond, they must be justified by the elimination of free-riders and by the
government policy of ensuring labor peace; and third, they must not
add significantly to the burden of free speech "inherent in the allow-
ance of a union or agency shop." '272
Justice Scalia and his group of justices had harsh criticism for this
test. As already noted, they charged that it was calculated to engender
further litigation, in large part because of the imprecise language cho-
sen by the majority. How is one to know, Justice Scalia asked, what is
"6germane" or whether an expense is "justified" by government policy?
And, how does one recognize a "significant additional burden" to First
Amendment rights? Justice Scalia concluded that the majority's three
prong test provided little guidance either to the Court or to litigants.
27 3
He proposed what he viewed as a simpler test and one that would ordi-
narily be more restrictive than that adopted by the Court. He said that
the only charges a union can constitutionally levy against nonmembers
are those that arise from performance of statutory duties: "A union
cannot arbitrarily charge nonmembers for any expenses except those
incurred for the conduct of activities in which the union owes a duty of
fair representation to the nonmembers being charged. 2 74
The majority asserted that the statute was too imprecise to make
this a workable test. Indeed, it claimed that the legislature deliberately
used general language in order to give unions "flexibility and discre-
tion." Thus, the majority concluded that the statute was a "poor crite-
rion" to determine the constitutionality of assessments.
2 75
269. Id. at 236.
270. 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
271. Id. at 456.
272. Lenhert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, Ill S. Ct. 1950, 1959 (interim ed. 1991).
273. Id.. at 1975-76 (Scalia, J., concurring).
274. Id. at 1979.
275. Id. at 1962.
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After detailing the test it would apply, the majority noted that the
petitioners had proposed two limitations on the use of public sector con-
tributions. First, they claimed that funds from nonmembers could not
constitutionally be used for lobbyirig that did not involve legislative rat-
ification of or appropriation for a collective bargaining agreement.2 7 6
None of the justices questioned the appropriateness of union expendi-
tures calculated to influence legislative action in support of a negotiated
contract. In Lehnert, however, the union had used nonmember funds to
support lobbying for teachers or for public employees generally.
Such lobbying, Justice Blackmun said, would not serve the interest
of labor peace nor would it eliminate free-riders. More important, such
conduct creates additional interference with a dissenter's First Amend-
ment rights. 27 7 Justice Marshall dissented from this part of the opin-
ion, 27 18 but Justice Scalia's group concurred because such lobbying was
not actually part of the collective bargaining process.2 79 Thus, the
Court voted eight to one to disallow the assessment, although there was
no majority rationale.
The second limitation urged by the petitioners was a prohibition
against using nonmember fees for activities not on behalf of their own
bargaining unit, even though the activities might support collective bar-
gaining generally. In particular, petitioners objected to assessments for
NEA and MEA who, in fact, received the bulk of the money paid by
members and nonmembers alike.280 The Court rejected this limitation
unanimously. Justice Blackmun's group observed that the affiliation fee
created a "pool of resources," economic, political, and informational,
that was always available to the local units, even if it was not used
every year. This was enough to justify the charges, although Justice
Blackmun warned that there were limits. 8 Justice Scalia agreed with
this resolution and commented that such affiliations and the expert con-
sulting services they entailed were tangible benefits to local units, even
when not used.28 2
The Court then turned to several expenditures that had been chal-
lenged by the petitioners. The Justice Blackmun and Justice Scalia
groups agreed that the union could not constitutionally assess nonmem-
bers to support a program designed to procure increased education
276. Id. at 1959.
277. Id. at 1959-60.
278. Id. at 1967-68.
279. Id. at 1980.
280. Id. at 1961.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1980-81.
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funding in Michigan. Justice Blackmun said this activity was not "ori-
ented toward gratification . . . of petitioner's collective bargaining
agreement."283 Justice Scalia, agreeing with the result but applying a
different rationale, found the activity not to be part of the statutory
bargaining duties of the union. 84
The petitioners also challenged assessments to support collective
bargaining and litigation in other states. Justice Blackmun's group and
Justice Marshall formed a majority which said that such collective bar-
gaining support was permissible as part of the contribution to NEA.285
But Justice Blackmun's and Justice Scalia's group both disallowed the
assessment for litigation expenses or for the expense of union literature
reporting about such litigation. Justice Blackmun compared this activ-
ity to "general lobbying" and found that it was not "germane" to col-
lective bargaining.2 86 Justice Scalia found no provision for it in the
union's statutory responsibilities. With Justice Blackmun's and Justice
Scalia's groups applying their consistent rationales, the Court reached
a similar result about union public relations expenditures that were cal-
culated to enhance the stature of the teaching profession generally.28
Although Blackmun and Scalia sometimes reached the same re-
sult, albeit using different rationales, they parted company over charges
for a teacher's publication that concerned teaching, professional devel-
opment, job opportunities, and other topics of interest to public school
teachers. Justice Scalia found dissemination of such information to be
outside the union's statutory responsibilities. This did not mean the ac-
tivity was improper, but it did mean the union could not assess non-
members who were unwilling to pay.2 88 Justice Blackmun's group and
Justice Marshall, however, formed a majority approving the expense.
They said the expenses of this publication did not impose any addi-
tional infringement on First Amendment rights which were already
burdened by the requirement of service fees. The amount of money at
issue here was simply de minimis28 9
The same five person majority upheld the assessment of nonmem-
bers in support of delegates to MEA and NEA conventions. 90 Justice
Scalia complained that these conventions did not relate solely to the
collective bargaifhing responsibilities of the local union, 9 a but Justice
283. Id. at 1963.
284. Id. at 1980.
285. Id. at 1963 (Blackmun, J.); id. at 1972-73 (Marshall, J., concurring in part).
286. Id. at 1963-64.
287. Id. at 1964.
288. Id. at 1980.
289. Id. at 1964.
290. Id. at 1964-65.
291. Id. at 1980 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Blackmun said this was not required by the First Amendment. Rather,
he said participation was "an important benefit of affiliation" particu-
larly since at least some of the meetings included programs on bargain-
ing strategies. 92
Finally, the Court addressed whether nonmembers could be as-
sessed for the expense of preparation for what would have been an ille-
gal strike. This issue produced the only six to three split, with Justice
Kennedy deserting Justice Scalia to join Justice Blackmun's group and
Justice Marshall. 93 The majority acknowledged that the expenses of
an illegal strike could not be charged to nonmembers. But while the
legislature had outlawed strikes, it had not restricted preparation for
strikes, a somewhat peculiar distinction. Nevertheless, the Court said
that a threat of a strike was a legitimate bargaining tool and was,
therefore, germane to the bargaining process.29' Justice Scalia was una-
ble to find that preparing for an unlawful strike was part of a union's
representational duty.2 95
3. Ingersoll Rand v. McClendon
Ingersoll Rand v. McClendon296 involved a law suit by a dis-
charged Texas salesman who claimed that his employer fired him
shortly before his pension plan vested, in order to avoid making pension
contributions. Texas is an employment-at-will state, but the Texas Su-
preme Court said the public policy exception to that doctrine limited
the employer's freedom of action. 297 Employment-at-will to the con-
trary, the Texas Supreme Court decided that employers cannot fire em-
ployees merely to avoid pension plans.
The real issue, of course, was not the status of Texas employment
law, but the contention that the Employment Retirement Security Act
of 1974298 (ERISA) preempted the employee's claim. The Texas Su-
preme Court asserted that the claim was not preempted because the
case had nothing to do with collection of pension benefits, which the
employee had not claimed. 99 Rather, the question as framed by the
Texas court was not whether the employee could collect his pension,
but whether his discharge entitled him to pursue lost wages and other
damages, including mental anguish and punitive damages.3 0
292. Id. at 1965.
293. Id. at 1981-82 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
294. Id. at 1965-66.
295. Id. at 1981 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
296. 111 S. Ct. 478 (interim ed. 1990).
297. Id. at 481.
298. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
299. Ingersoll, 111 S. Ct. at 481.
300. Id.
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Despite the Texas court's attempts at circumvention, the Supreme
Court, in a unanimous decision, found the state claim preempted by
ERISA. The Court said the plaintiff's claim was preempted under ei-
ther of two arguments. First, the lawsuit was expressly preempted by
section 514(a), 0 1 which provides that the federal statute supersedes
"any and all state laws insofar as they ... relate to any employee
benefit plan . . "302 The Court noted the breadth of this language
and said that it was possible for a state law to "relate to" a benefit plan
for purposes of ERISA, even if that had not been the intent. Moreover,
the fact that the state claim might be consistent with ERISA is of no
relevance.3 03
The Court had little difficulty concluding that the Texas cause of
action "related to" an ERISA covered benefit plan. The plaintiff
claimed that the pension plan itself was irrelevant since its sole func-
tion was to establish the employer's improper motive for the discharge.
Damages for the employer's conduct, however, would not, under the
plaintiff's theory, include lost pension benefits. The Court said that the
plaintiff's theory missed the point. The key point was that, without the
plan, there was no cause of action. In order to recover, the plaintiff had
to plead and prove the existence of an employer motive to defeat an
ERISA covered plan. It was not possible, then, to conclude that the
claim did not relate to a plan covered by the statute.30 4 This result, the
Court said, was consistent with its understanding of the statute's pur-
pose, which was to minimize the administrative and financial burdens
of complying with the ERISA.3 0 5
In addition to its holding that the state claim was expressly pre-
empted, the Court said it was also impliedly preempted because it con-
flicted with the cause of action created under ERISA. Section 510306 of
the statute makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge a plan par-
ticipant for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any bene-
fit under the plan. That language covered the plaintiff's. allegations in
this case, and section 502(a)307 created exclusive federal jurisdiction for
civil actions to enforce these rights.30 8
301. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
302. Id.
303. Ingersoll, 111 S. Ct. at 483.
304. Id. at 483-84.
305. Id. at 484.
306. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988).
307. Id. § 1132(a)(3)(e).
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The Court acknowledged that the mere existence of a federal
cause of action does not necessarily preclude parallel state claims, un-
less Congress so intended. The Court said that such intent existed here.
The Court compared section 510 of ERISA to section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act,"0 9 after which it said section 502(a) was
modeled. Although section 301 does not preclude the jurisdiction of
state courts, federal law controls, no matter where the action is filed.3 10
State court actions are not possible under section 502 of ERISA. More-
over, the Court said that an independent state action would undermine
the federal enforcement scheme.3 '
The Court concluded that when it is clear or may fairly be as-
sumed that activities which a state purports to regulate are protected
by section 510 of ERISA, due regard for the federal enactment re-
quires that state jurisdiction must yield. That was true even though the
plaintiff did not seek pension benefits in his state claim. The Court
noted that the relief plaintiff sought was within the power of the fed-
eral courts to provide under ERISA. 12
III. CONCLUSION
The 1990 term ends the chapter of the Court's history that in-
cludes Justice Thurgood Marshall who, along with recently retired Jus-
tice William Brennan, helped shape American labor law in significant
ways. By 1990, most of Justice Marshall's traditional liberal support in
labor cases was gone. Nonetheless, his separate opinion in Lehnert pro-
duced at least a partial victory for the union and he joined a unanimous
Court in Johnson Controls. Moreover, he was with the majority in
American Hospital Association, a decision that will make resisting
unionization more difficult for hospitals. These are not the cases for
which Justice Marshall will be remembered. They are, nevertheless,
significant contributions from an illustrious career.
309. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
310. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
311. Ingersoll, III S. Ct. at 485-86 (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54
(1987)).
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